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Summary
The key findings of the paper are as follows:
1. The local government reform created a legal framework in which normative autonomy of local
governments is well-protected. However, limited financial autonomy diverts local development from
responsiveness to local needs.
2. Local governments reacted in an innovative way to the fiscal pressure of the 1990s. Their efforts were
nonetheless limited by their inadequate expertise, the unpredictability of state funding systems, and the
diverting effects of state grants. The fragmentation of the local government system resulted in an
unresolved problem with economies of scale and inter-municipality coordination.
3. The local government system is fully democratic in formal terms and provides all direct and indirect means
for citizens to participate in local public life. Citizen participation in local public affairs is nonetheless
limited in Hungary and local elites do not show much intention to further the inclusion of citizens into the
local decision-making process. Electoral reforms in 1994 did not adequately contribute to local democracy.
4. While the principles of the local government system are widely shared by Hungarian citizens, actual
performance satisfies only a relative majority of them.
The conclusion is that a new local government reform should strengthen the middle level to coordinate municipal-
level activities, introduce the external financial and political audit to promote horizontal and vertical accountability,
and, last but not least, contribute to capacity-building on the subnational level.
1. Introduction
The single most important reform of local administration in Hungary was the introduction of the democratic local
government system in 1990. The previous communist system, highly centralized and dominated by the Communist
Party, was replaced by a new institutional arrangement that was intended to be more democratic and efficient and
capable of counter-balancing the power of the central government. Since this large-scale reform, only a few but
important amendments have been implemented. Still, much has happened on the local level over the last twelve
years.
This paper sets out to assess the effect of the reforms of the Hungarian local government system on the capacity for
local self-governance. The concept of capacity for local self-governance refers to the existence of autonomous,
efficient, democratic and legitimate subnational administrative units. Consequently, the concept implies four
dimensions: municipal autonomy, bureaucratic efficiency, internal democracy and popular legitimacy.
Autonomy is defined here as the capacity to act independently. Local autonomy is freedom of self-determination and
freedom from the influence of other, especially higher administrative, bodies. (For a more detailed discussion about
the difference between democracy and autonomy, see Pratchett 2001.) The extent of local autonomy first of all
depends on constitutional and other legal guarantees. Legal norms must ensure the freedom of subnational units and
the functions they can or are obliged to fulfill. Legal autonomy is thus weakened by the central regulations of local
service provision. Nevertheless, local autonomy is more than the freedom from external influence, it requires a local
resource base that is independent of state funding. Therefore, the level of financial autonomy is also a measure of
local autonomy.
Efficiency includes here not only efficiency, i.e. the ratio between outputs and inputs, but also effectiveness, i.e. the
capacity to meet the goals set by the organization itself. Local government systems cannot survive without a certain
level of bureaucratic efficiency, and their public image largely depends on the quality and costs of service delivery.
Both administrative and managerial reforms aim at the improvement of bureaucratic efficiency.
Internal democracy is a dimension of local self-governance. Democracy refers to the collective process through
which differences are articulated and resolved – it does not simply follow from autonomy. Local government is after
all a government and can be oppressive. The freedom from external influence actually provides a good ground for
undemocratic practices if unaccompanied by appropriate political as well as social arrangements that ensure the
competitive selection of municipal leaders and include people in the decision-making process.
The capacity for self-governance requires a certain level of popular legitimacy. The acceptance of local governments
as political institutions is a prerequisite of sustainable local governance. Legitimacy of the local government system
has two dimensions here. On the one hand, legitimacy refers to the support for the local government system, and
confidence in it. This evaluation depends more on the everyday performance of local governments and,
consequently, is more volatile. On the other hand, legitimacy is the degree to which citizens view the system of local
governments as morally justifiable. This latter type of legitimacy is more linked to the moral basis of the whole
political system and changes more slowly.
The introduction of the local government system in Hungary, and the subsequent modifications to the system,
intentionally and inadvertently, shaped the capacity for democratic self-governance on the subnational level. This
paper investigates the degree to which capacity for self-governance has been strengthened or weakened by local
government reforms. The first four sections discuss the four dimensions of capacity for self-governance and the last
one consolidates the findings of the paper.
2. Legal Autonomy Restricted by Limited Financial
Autonomy
The autonomy of local governments is guaranteed by the Hungarian Constitution. Chapter IX lays out the basic
territorial division of the country (capital, counties, towns, and villages) and declares the right of these units to local
self-government: “Local self-government is the independent and democratic management of local public affairs that
affects the community of local citizens, the exercise of local authority in the interest of the local population. (42. §)”
Every community is entitled to a local government and every local government has the same basic rights, defended
by the Constitutional Court and other courts. The very first of these rights is that the local representative body “shall
independently regulate and administrate the affairs of local government and its decisions may be reviewed only with
respect to their legality” (44/A §, 1. a.). The same paragraph also stipulates that local governments are to manage
their financial-economic affairs independently, are entitled to funds for the implementation of their duties, and have
the power of local taxation. Duties for local governments can be determined only by law and the Local Government
Act requires a two-third majority of the Parliament.
The Local Government Act in 1990 and its modification in 1994 are based on these constitutional grounds. The Act
lists the mandatory tasks of local governments: municipalities are obliged to provide preschool and primary school
education, basic health care and welfare services, public lighting, cemeteries, healthy drinking water, and the
protection of ethnic and national minorities. Cities have additional obligations. The Act also allows for optional
duties, giving local governments the right to voluntarily undertake other duties if these tasks have not already been
assigned to other administrative bodies by law and if local governments have enough of their own resources to carry
them out.
As a compensation of the forced amalgamations of the Communist period, each local community is entitled to form
a local government. The consequent application of this principle led to a highly (though not exceptional in Europe)
fragmented local government system. Each locality became an independent, autonomous local government and the
number of local units increased from less than 1600 to more than 3100. The average local government has a little
more than 3200 inhabitants and more than half of the local governments have a population of less than 1000 (though
they form only 7.7 percent of the country's population). The widespread recognition of the autonomy principle can
be illustrated by the fact that the number of local governments is still increasing. The Parliament has authorized the
secession of more than 80 small communities since 1990, even if these new local governments are often very small
(the smallest has only 148 inhabitants) and the motivation for the secessions usually economic. For example,
Pétfürdo formed only one fifth of the population of Várpalota, but produced half of the municipal tax base before
separation.
The autonomy of middle-level local governments is less protected. The constitutional design in 1990 gave priority to
municipalities and neglected the issue of establishing a middle level. The interests vested in the existing institutional
arrangements have since made the setup of this level very difficult. While counties (NUTS 3) have, literally, a
thousand-year history and are named in the Constitution, they have no independent tax base and their competences
are limited. The need for regional level (NUTS 2) to receive EU funds pressured the Parliament to establish seven
regions, but they serve as statistical units for the moment and have no institutional arrangements. The problem of the
weak middle level will be discussed later in this paper.
Legal supervision over local governments was originally the responsibility of the Commissioners of the Republic,
but this duty has since been transferred to the heads of the Public Administrative Offices of the capital and counties.
If local governments do not follow the decisions of the heads of the Public Administrative Offices voluntarily, the
Constitutional Court has the right to abolish unconstitutional decrees of local governments. This happened only
eleven times in 2001, while Public Administrative Offices called for the change of illegal local government
decisions 1568 times (4 percent of all decrees). There is only legal supervision over local government decisions, no
external body has the right to evaluate the substantive content of the decisions of the local community.
Under exceptional circumstances, the Parliament has the right to dissolve the representative body of a local
government, but must set the date of elections within sixty days. The use of this right is indeed exceptional.
Although the Parliament effectively threatened some dysfunctioning local governments with dissolution over the last
twelve years, Parliamentary parties have never abused this opportunity.
Experience demonstrates that courts, and especially the Constitutional Court, are effective in defending the legal
autonomy of local governments. In this respect, the rule of law is well established in Hungary.
While legal autonomy is secured in Hungary, the financial autonomy of local governments are increasingly limited
in three ways. First, central regulation penetrates more and more into the provision of local government services.
Functional autonomy cannot be gauged only by the number and importance of tasks devolved to the local level. The
existence and extensiveness of centrally regulated quantitative and qualitative standards for decentralized services
also influence the degree of autonomy (see Jacobsen 2000). The level of central regulation varies by services.
Education, for example, is everywhere a highly institutionalized policy area, since textbooks, minimum
qualifications and teacher salaries, or even, classroom sizes are regulated. A similar area is local administrative
personnel. The point is that both the number and coverage of these regulations are slowly growing. The number of
such standards has been increasing since the beginning of the 1990s. While this process may increase the rationality
and efficiency of local services, it certainly constrains local autonomy. The gradual reforms of the local government
system have not served to maintain the local autonomy declared in 1990. Some argue, however, that the restriction
of local government freedom in a highly fragmented system has contributed to the quality of local service delivery
without seriously compromising its basic principles.
The second limitation is a more frequent complaint of local governments and can consistently be found on the
agenda of debates on local-central relationships. Local government leaders often feel that the duties transferred to
the local level do not match to the low levels of respective state funding provided for their delivery. The Parliament
delegates new duties to municipalities, while providing only part of the needed funding. Moreover, the centrally
regulated quantitative and qualitative standards are often costly. For example, the salary levels of local civil servants
and public employees are set by the state, but must be paid off by local governments. Local government leaders refer
to the Constitution and the Local Government Act, which explicitly state that local governments are “entitled to state
support commensurate to the scope of such duties.” In this argument, local governments are entitled to full support.
Representatives of the state claim, nevertheless, that their only duty is to create the opportunity for local incomes,
which are not necessarily state transfers, and the real problem is that local government leaders are unwilling to
confront their constituency with proposals to increase local taxes. Whatever the argument, the maneuvering room for
local governments is constrained by under-funded, mandatory tasks.
A related problem, perhaps the most important, is the financial dependence of local governments on state resources.
Although their proportion has declined from 64 percent in 1994 to a little more than 50 percent at the end of the
1990s, state transfers are still the most important source of municipal budgets. Within this category, the share of
earmarked grants increased from 63 percent (1993) to 77 percent (1998). Thus, the proportion of earmarked grants
in the total budget of local governments has not significantly changed in spite of the general decline in the share of
state funding. The role of shared revenues – mostly personal income tax and, to a lesser extent, taxes on automobiles
– declined between 1990 and 1994, when the ratio of the personal income tax returned to the municipality was
reduced from 100 to 30 percent. It then went up to 40 percent (1998), but half of this was redistributed among
municipalities as an equalization mechanism. Under the new government, this share fell to as low as 5 percent.
Less than one-third of local government revenues comes from local taxes. The most important local tax is the
business tax (84 percent in 1998). There are huge differences among local governments in the amount of revenue
generated from business taxes. Budapest alone collects 45 percent of this tax, while there are municipalities where
business tax income is minimal. This is partly the consequence of economic development, but the existence or lack
of political courage also influences the level of business tax. The fact that only a small part of local taxes are
collected from citizens (around 10 percent of all local taxes) also indicates a problem with political support.
In sum, legal-normative autonomy of local governments are secured in Hungary according to the original design as
prescribed in the Constitution and Local Government Act. Nonetheless, the intention of local government reform to
create a viable local government system, which has the capacity for local self-governance, has only partially been
realized with respect to financial autonomy.
3. Efficiency Problems in the Context of Fiscal Pressure and
Fragmentation
Local expenditure decreased from around 16 percent to around 12 percent of GDP in the 1990s. This process was
not the result of a policy discriminating against local governments, since the share of public expenditures in GDP
declined from 54 percent (1994) to 39 percent (1998) and then stabilized at this level. The share of local
expenditures in total public expenditures decreased only slightly, from 27 to 25 percent (Temesi 2000). The real
value of local government expenditures decreased by 5 percent annually in the second half of the 1990s (Davey
2000). The diminishing public sector has put great fiscal pressure on local governments since the introduction of the
local government system.
The reaction of local governments to fiscal pressure clearly showed the superiority of local governments to Soviet-
type councils. Local leaders did much to alleviate economic hardships for the poor and unemployed. Innovative
efforts helped to boost their economies. Still, these effort were not always successful, which is indicative of
structural problems.
New Public Management (NPM) ideas became fashionable in the 1990s when neoliberalism was the dominant
paradigm in economic thought. It was sometimes highly exaggerated. “Entrepreneurial local government” was an
often-heard management concept in the early 1990s. Municipal governments went directly to the market and acted
as business units, as if they were companies. Several of these ventures bankrupted quite quickly which disqualified
the “entrepreneur local government” approach. Other marketization measures proved to be more durable when
adapted to Hungarian conditions. A wide variety of new forms of service delivery was invented (Kopanyi et al.
2000). Local governments established limited liability companies to obtain VAT refunds and employed workers in a
more flexible manner. Foundations, founded, funded and controlled by local governments, provide services (like
crime prevention) outside of rigid state regulations. NGOs were involved into the provision of social services. Some
services (like central kitchens for kindergartens and schools) were outsourced. Leaders often had the courage to
downscale or close underused institutions. Revenues were raised by the privatization of local government assets. A
few municipalities already introduced quality management systems (ISO).
Nevertheless, micromanagement successes were accompanied by structural difficulties. One of them is the lack of
adequate expertise at the local level. The introduction of the local government system was a radical reform, which
needed a new form of expertise (e.g. local tax collection) in a very short time period. Moreover, the large number of
small local governments engenders a long-term shortage of expertise. 3,200 local units cannot obtain qualified staff
for all their administrative and social services. In addition, salaries are not particularly high in the civil service.
Local governments lost their most qualified people, who could earn much more in the private sector.
With a shortage of expertise, it is very difficult to control the institutional mess created by the reaction to fiscal
crisis. Messy relationships are often due to the missing expertise, as the understanding of management ideas is not
systematic. The quality of municipal budgeting and financial reporting cannot be improved if local administrative
leaders are not trained and paid according to their enlarging expertise. The effectiveness of tax collection is also
limited by the shortage of trained and experienced staff. The lack of adequate planning is partially a consequence of
the missing administrative and professional expertise on the local level. Some smaller administrative changes
already encouraged the raising of qualifications for civil servants, but more reforms are needed to eliminate this
major obstacle of local government efficiency.
A second major problem with new management techniques is the lack of accountability and transparency. In many
cases, this is intentional. In addition to the fact that local governments want to avoid rigid and ever-changing state
regulations, local leaders like the idea of a second, uncontrolled budget. Local services can be cross-subsidized by
the new forms of service delivery in a non-transparent way (Kopanyi et al. 2000: 22). Moreover, new, opaque
institutional arrangements allow local politicians to pay off their political bills by favoring their cronies without
public control. New institutional forms are utilized, when outsourcing, in an effort to avoid procurement procedures.
NPM was not fully implemented in Hungary.
Finally, adaptation to fiscal pressure did not make local governments sustainable. In many cases, privatized assets
were replaced with new, more appropriate assets by investing in local infrastructure (sewage system, roads, etc.). In
many municipalities, however, the total assets of local government decreased and the remaining and new assets are
not liquid enough to obtain extra revenues in hard times. Capital revenue sources cannot simply be replaced with
local tax revenues because of the limited tax base. To be fair, however, increases in local taxes and fees on services
are often hindered more by insufficient political courage than by the poverty of the locality.
The state itself contributes to management problems on the local level by its unpredictability and distrust in local
efficiency. Regulation is not simply growing, as it was mentioned before, but also changes in an unforeseeable
manner. Local governments are reluctant to undertake multi-year projects because state rules and financing may
change in the meantime. Two-thirds of CAOs identified the high operating costs of previously implemented projects
as a problem. The diverting effect of state grants or the lack of analysis of an investment's long-term influence on
budgets often results in great difficulties for local governments in covering the running expenses of previously
implemented projects. State financing often encourages the building of extensive capacities without providing
knowledge or training on how to manage them after their implementation.
The mistrust of the state in local capacities and its diverting effect on local management manifests itself not only in
state support for very specific projects (e.g. building of gyms), but also in the increasing share of earmarked grants
in general. The low proportion of general grants limits autonomy and impedes the fiscal adjustment process at the
local level (Kopanyi et al. 2000) Local leaders are more interested in lobbying for larger formula-driven transfers for
specific policy areas and maintaining existing structures than the local reform of services. Although the Municipality
Bankruptcy Law is fully implemented, “deficit grants” do not contribute to local efforts at cost efficiency. The state
reacted to deficiencies in local efficiency with the tightening of autonomy and not the enhancing of local capacities.
This works against the implementation of municipality-level reforms.
In addition to the expertise shortage, the fragmentation of the Hungarian local government system has two other
important consequences for municipal efficiency. One is the challenge of the economies of scale; this comes up in
every country where many small local governments exist. The share of the costs of local administration is 20 percent
in the total budget of municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants, while this proportion is 30 percent in
municipalities with less than 500 inhabitants. Though the support of the establishment or preservation of joint
offices was increased in the mid-1990s, village mayors still intend to form their own offices and their efforts have
been successful in some places. Some local services are also more expensive if provided in every municipality
separately.
Another closely related problem is the absence of a middle level. The introduction of the local government system in
1990 focused on the municipal level and the decision on the middle level was practically delayed. The designers of
the system hoped that municipalities will cooperate voluntarily to provide local services. This hope largely failed
even when a new law on local government cooperation introduced some incentives for cooperation. The 1994
reform also strengthened the county level by giving it more legitimacy through direct elections. However, no county
tax was introduced and few competences were transferred to the county level. It turned out that the central
government was not interested in the filling out of the institutional vacuum on the middle level and local
governments were not interested in the establishment of a potential rival in service delivery. The 1996 law on the
councils of territorial development yielded more positive results by providing coherence for many economic
development projects. Their private-partnership composition received much criticism, however, for lack of the
transparency and accountability of their functioning (Pálné 2000). The rightist government promoted two types of
statistical regions as long-term solutions for the problem of the missing middle level after 1998. While large regions
(NUTS 2) did not receive many competences, some services (e.g. registration offices which issue passports, driver
licenses, and other documents) were organized on the level of “small regions” (NUTS 4). Political tensions impeded
the government in the submission of a proposal for large-scale reform. Since the tension is still present and territorial
reforms require a two-thirds majority in the Parliament, the large-scale modification of the Local Government Act is
rather a dream than a close reality.
To sum up, local governments reacted in an innovative way to the fiscal pressure of the 1990s. Their efforts were
nonetheless limited by their inadequate expertise, the unpredictability of state funding systems, the diverting effects
of state grants. The fragmentation of the local government system results in an unresolved problem with economies
of scale and inter-municipality coordination.
4. Wide Autonomy Does Not Necessarily Mean Democracy
According to the Hungarian Constitution, local self-government is the local citizens' legal due. “Eligible voters
exercise the right to local government through the representative body that they elect and by way of local
referendum. (44. § 1)” In the Constitution, local referendum is treated on par with indirect representation.
Mayors of municipalities, capital districts, and the capital are directly elected in Hungary. (Between 1990 and 1994
only mayors of small municipalities were directly elected.) Mayors are ex officio members of the local council (if
they are not elected as representatives). The electoral system differs in larger and smaller municipalities. In
municipalities of less than 10,000 inhabitants, voters may choose as many candidates from a single list as the
number of seats in the local council. In larger municipalities, there are 10 or more individual constituencies and
citizens may vote for one of the candidates in their respective constituencies. The minority of seats is distributed
among compensation lists of organizations (parties and NGOs) that run candidates; this mechanism makes the
composition of local councils more proportionate. The councils of the capital and counties are also directly elected
via party lists. So Budapest voters receive minimum four ballots with candidates for constituency representative,
district mayor, capital mayor, and lists for capital council.
A special Hungarian institution is the minority self-government. Minorities in Hungary live dispersed in the country,
so the system of minority local representation cannot be based on territorial units. Ethnic and national minority
groups have the right to form minority self-governments through a special electoral procedure. Municipality
councils must obtain the consent of minority self-governments for decisions that affect interests in minority
education, culture, etc. The law on minortiy self-government recognizes the right of individuals to choose identies
and, therefore, the choice of identity is absolutely free and confidential. Candidates can run and voters can vote in
minority elections without needing to prove membership in the ethnic or national minority that they represent and
vote for. For more information on minority self-governments, see Csefkó— Pálné (1999).
From an institutional point of view, local elections work well in Hungary. Voters perfectly understand the
mechanism of election and electoral frauds are as rare as in Western Europe. In general, there is competition for
local government positions. In some villages, however, it is difficult to recruit enough candidates, and elections were
canceled in a few places in every local election. While a little more than two candidates compete for a single
position in municipalities with 10,000 or less inhabitants, this ratio is more than seven in larger local governments
(Soós— Kálmán 2002:90).
Turnout at local elections is not particularly high, though slowly increasing. While only 40 percent turned out in
1990, more than 45 percent voted in 1998. Consequently, the electoral reform in 1994 (directly elected mayors plus
one-round elections) did not significantly increase turnout. As a result of the present, high competition among
political forces, an even higher turnout is expected this October, especially in large cities. The turnout is higher in
small villages (where voters know candidates personally and local public life is simple) and in Budapest (where both
media exposure and electoral competition are high and thus local public life is simplified by parties). When personal
income is included in the analysis on the level of the individual voter, however, the effect of the size of a
muncipality disappears. In this case, voters with higher income turn out at parliamentary elections, while people
with lower income vote locally. The size of municipa
lity has no significant effect on turnout and participation is not higher in small communities. (Hajnal 2000)
Turnout rates in Hungary
Type of Election 1990 1994 1998 2002
Parliamentary (1st round) 65.1% 68.9% 57.0% 70.5%
Local government (1st round in 1990) 40.2% 43.4% 45.7% 20 October
Source: www.valasztas.hu
Wide autonomy given to local governments does not make citizens politically active. Petitions and public
demonstrations were organized in only 13 and 3 percent of municipalities, respectively, in 2000. Half of these
activities were initiated by citizens directly, though NGOs and parties were also important initiators. (Soós-Kálmán
2002:91-92)
Data about local referenda also demonstrate the passivity of the Hungarian citizen. Eight to twenty local referenda
were initiated annually in more than 3,200 municipalities between 1999 and 2002. Since 50 percent of local voters
must turn out to make the referendum legally effective, many of the initiatives fail for lack of local citizens' interest.
For example, only 8 and 9 referenda were successfully implemented in 2000 and 2001, respectively. Referenda are
used in two exceptional cases only. The law requires referendum for territorial changes (separation from a
municipality or move to another county); therefore this is the subject of voting in some municipalities every year.
The other category is the strong conflict over big projects, in general unwanted facilities (toxic waste dumps,
shopping malls, etc.). This important element of the local government reform of 1990, which aimed at direct
democracy, is largely underused in Hungary.
Initiatives of local referenda in Hungary (1999-2002) 1999 2000 2001 2002
Territorial change 6 5 7 4
Projects, unwanted facilities 10 14 5 4
Other 1 1 0 0
Total 17 20 12 8
Source: http://www.valasztas.hu/parval2002/onkweb/index.hu
Local governments do not work to include local citizens into their decision-making. One public hearing is
compulsory for Hungarian local governments, and two-thirds of municipalities did not hold more than this one
mandatory hearing in 2000. In the same year, one-third of the municipalities felt obliged to make the draft budget
public and perhaps provoke public discussion. In municipalities where NGOs exist, only 29 and 38 percent of local
governments attempted to involve them in the general decision-making (e.g. inviting NGO representatives into the
committees of local councils as “external” members) and in the discussion of the budget, respectively.
Approximately one-third of Hungarian municipalities made an effort to actively inform media on local government
issues and policy positions. (Soós— Kálmán 2000: 45-47)
The price of fragmentation in the local government system for local democracy is the large number of municipalities
where vertical accountability is weak. In small local governments, there are no social institutions to make local
leaders accountable. There are no media outlets in 58 percent of Hungarian municipalities and only 23 percent of
them have media outlets independent of local government subsidies. Partes rarely exist or are organizationally very
weak in small municipalities.
The often heard argument is that the lack of formal institutions is natural in small places and they are actually not
needed because social pressure on local politicians and forms of direct participation fulfill the function of
democratic control. It is difficult to empirically evaluate this hypothesis for lack of research. Nevertheless, data from
the surveys managed by the Tocqueville Research Center in 2001 ( www.t-rc.org ) shed some light on politics in
small places.
Higher social pressure and more direct democracy may be indicated by frequent face-to-face contacts between local
representatives and ordinary citizens. The sheer number of contacts is expected to be high and relatively higher than
in larger municipalities where representatives have more indirect, insitutionalized and formalized contacts with their
electorate. This hypothesis is unsupported by data. The survey question was as follows: “In an average month, how
many local citizens contact you as their representative, either during office hours or at some other time?”
Representatives in municipalities with 5000 or less inhabitants meet 10.6 citizens per month on average. This
number is not really impressive. What is more, representatives in larger municipalities meet more voters (14.2).
Another set of questions aimed to reveal how representatives form their opinions. (“Before forming a final opinion
on issues of local government, you obviously listen to the opinion of others. Now, how influential is the opinion of
the following people on the formation of your opinion?”) One may expect that ordinary citizens have an
exceptionally high influence on local representatives' opinion in small places, and this effect is higher than in larger
municipalities where organizations like parties and media indirectly channel public opinion. As the following table
shows, local representatives in small municipalities evaluated the influence of ordinary citizens as 5.09 on a 7-point
scale (with seven indicating the greatest influence). This number is high, higher than the effect of the mayor (4.03)
or the head of the administration (3.99) on opinion formation. Nonetheless, the perceived influence of individual
voters is even higher in large municipalities (5.42). If this is not simply a social desirability effect, the surprising
conclusion is that councilors and mayors in small municipalities are less responsive to local citizens' needs than in
large local governments. One can conclude that personal accountability is much weaker in small municipalities, and
that such communities have a greater tendency toward elitist top-down governance.
Citizens' influence on the opinion formation of local
representatives (means)
Mayors Councilors All
representatives
Less than 5000 inhabitants 5.41
(N=105)
5.05
(N=844)
5.09 (N=949)
More than 5000 inhabitants 5.41
(N=37)
5.43
(N=710)
5.42 (N=747)
Hungary 5.41
(N=142)
5.22
(N=1554)
5.24 (N=1696)
Source: Local Representative Survey 2001
A final proof of the illusory nature of the “small is beautiful” thesis in terms of democracy is the frequency of
collective, community-level decision-making. As it was mentioned earlier, a question in the survey with
administrative leaders collected information about the number of public hearings and forums. The hypothesis of
direct democracy in small communities predicts frequent meetings with citizens in small places and more frequent
meetings than in larger municipalities. In reality, municipalities with 5000 or less inhabitants had 1.4 meetings on
average in 2000. This frequency is only a little higher than what is legally required. What is more, larger local
governments held 2.4 public hearings and meetings on average. These findings do not support the greater existence
of direct democracy in small, face-to-face communities at all.
What these numbers actually demonstrate is the inward-looking, elitist and technocratic political culture of local
politicians in all municipalities. But in large municipalities, at least by Central European standards, there are clear
signs of democratic control, especially in Budapest. Strong competitive parties, watchdog organizations, media
coverage (though never fully unbiased) all contribute to a certain level of democratic process.
Small local communities obtained large autonomy in the local government reform of 1990. But who prevents
municipalities from becoming feudal kingdoms of local elites? Who defends local citizens' interests? The answer in
a democracy is that local citizens must be active and force their leaders to follow the wishes of their will. However,
the density of civil society is low in Hungary by Western European standards, and the social capital accumulated in
these networks is often used for the benefit of the few and not the many. And what if the distribution of local
resources (financial, human and social capital) is so skewed that minority groups are easily oppressed? There have
been no reforms to promote local democracy by externally defending certain interests and providing new tools for
internal defense.
To sum up, the institutional system is fully democratic in Hungary and provides all direct and indirect means for
citizens to participate in local public life. Citizen participation in local public affairs is nonetheless limited in
Hungary and local elites do not show much intention to further the inclusion of citizens into the local decision-
making process. Electoral reforms in 1994 (direct election of mayors and county councils) did not adequately
contribute to local democracy.
5. Legitimacy
All the dimensions of local governance discussed so far contribute to the level of legitimacy. Autonomy of local
communities satisfies the demands of localism and legitimizes the local government system. Well-performing local
governments prove the efficiency of the local government system which further enhances its legitimacy. Finally,
inclusive decision-making and democratic practices may also be a source of legitimacy. There are however other
factors, independent of the local government system, which contribute to the legitimacy of local governance, e.g. the
general political culture and developments on the national level.
Unfortunately, there are few longitudinal and country-level data on the legitimacy of local governments. A
comparison of the local turnout with the turnout at parliamentary elections clearly shows that voters regard local
governments as institutions of secondary importance. This can be an effect of the media, which is developed only on
the country level and thus focus mainly on the more spectacular national events.
City surveys (Marelyin— Kabai— Dénes: 2001) show an average support of 44-56 percent for local governments
without a clear trend of decline in the 1990s. Satisfaction with local government performance obviously varies from
municipality to municipality. Even so, two trends are quite clear. Surveys both at country-wide and local level
indicate that citizens are more satisfied with the situation at the local level than at the national level. For example, in
the Eleven Town Survey (conducted in 1999 and 2000 by the author of this paper), the satisfaction with the progress
of the country ranged from 2.0 to 2.5 with a mean of 2.3 on a 5-point scale (with five indicating the greatest
satisfaction); satisfaction with the town ranged from 2.6 to 3.2 with a mean of 2.9. The other inference is that the
average satisfaction is below the medium value (3) even at the local level. Overall, slightly more residents were
dissatisfied rather than satisfied with their local government, with 27 percent of respondents fully or partially
satisfied with the town while 29 percent expressed full or partial dissatisfaction. Not much is known about the
legitimacy of counties. What is certain is that their public awareness is very low, which means a low legitimacy by
definition.
Hungarian citizens trust in local governments more than in political parties, the Parliament, the central government,
or the media. Only the Constitutional Court and the president of the republic have more political capital than local
governments. What is also important is that the general satisfaction with local governments has been increasing
since the fall of Communism (Marelyin-Kabai-Dénes, 2001; TÁRKI survey November 2000, see www.tarki.hu) –
althought this positive trend came to an end over the last few years, and trust in local governments are now moving
in the 50-54 point range on a 100-point scale (Szerencsés 2002).
An indirect measure of legitimacy is a comparison with the past. More than half (52% on average) of the
respondents of the Eleven Town Survey, expressed a preference for local governments over old councils (17.5%).
The result of a representative national survey (Marelyin— Kabai— Dénes: 2001) is very mixed. Although more
people prefer the existing local government system to the local administration system of the previous regime, they
form only a relative majority. Thirty-six percent evaluated the local government system higher, while 23 percent
claimed that Soviet-type councils worked better. The picture is even darker if these data are compared to those
collected one year after the implementation of the local government system. In 1991, only 11 percent regarded
Communist councils as better, while 44 percent supported local governments. The decline was especially high in
municipalities of less than 1,000 inhabitants (Hajnal 2000). Amalgamation in the seventies affected these small
settlements severely and their inhabitants had especially high expectations in the first days of the local government
system. But these high hopes were not realized for lack of financial autonomy and the low democratic and service
performance of the new political units. Autonomy is no longer a legitimizing force.
The Eleven Town Survey had two other questions that shed some light on the legitimacy of the system of local
governments. A comparison was made between the existing system based on the lay principle of political
representation and an administrative system based on professionals appointed by higher authorities. A large majority
(77%) supported local autonomy and democracy, while only every seventh respondent (14%) optioned for a
seemingly more efficient system. Two other statements assessed the diffuse support for democracy in general and
for local governments. Almost 60 percent of respondents in towns of 10,000-20,000 inhabitants considered
democracy as the best possible regime and only 10 percent disagreed with that. The local government system
obtained even higher support. Two of three respondents accepted the local government system and only 6 percent
did not. As abstract principles, the idea of local government is highly supported by the population of this
municipality category. The legitimacy of the local government system, perceived as the support for the moral basis
of the system, is high.
To sum up, the main principles of the local government system are widely shared by the Hungarian population and
few people want Soviet-type councils back. Approximately as many citizens trust in, and are satisfied with, local
governments as the number of dissatisfied and untrusting voters. Reforms of the local government system did not
contribute much to its legitimacy.
6. Assessing the Effect of Local Government Reforms on the
Capacity for Local Self-Governance
A recurrent theme of this paper is the wide autonomy given to even the smallest localities and the consequences of
this autonomy for the democracy, efficiency, and legitimacy of local governments. Local autonomy is the basis of
the Hungarian local government system and all reforms have respected it since 1990. No proposition for
amalgamation has ever been on the political agenda because of the wide acceptance of the normative value of
autonomy and the political impossibility of implementing such a change.
The high fragmentation of the local government system nonetheless produced some challenges. Normative
autonomy is not accompanied with financial autonomy, as the state does not trust in the capacity of local
governments to use money adequately. Indeed, the lack of qualified staff, the often opaque and unaccountable
handling of investments, and the elitist decision-making of local governments support this argument. The silent re-
centralization is however not the right way to resolve those challenges. A new local government reform should
strengthen the middle level to coordinate municipal-level activities, introduce the external financial and political
audit to promote horizontal and vertical accountability, and, last but not least, contribute to capacity-building on the
subnational level.
In the early 1990s, the legitimacy of local governments stemmed from the newly established autonomy of localities.
When illusions disappeared, inclusive decision-making and local development became the basis of citizens'
evaluation. Since the local government system forms a pillar of the Hungarian political system and the principles of
their existence enjoy wide support, successful local government reforms contribute much to the legitimacy of the
whole political system.
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Appendix – The Constitution of Hungary
Chapter IX Local Governments
Article 41
(1) The territory of the Republic of Hungary is divided into the following administrative units: the capital, the
counties, the cities and communities.
(2) The capital is divided into districts. Districts may be formed in cities as well.
Article 42
Eligible voters of the communities, cities, the capital and its districts, and the counties have the right to local
government. Local government refers to independent, democratic management of local affairs and the exercise of
local public authority in the interests of the local population.
Article 43
(1) The fundamental rights of all local governments (see Article 44/A.) are equal. The duties of local governments
may differ.
(2) The rights and duties of local governments shall be determined by law. The lawful exercise of the powers of
local government is afforded the legal protection of the courts and any local government may appeal to the
Constitutional Court for the protection of its rights.
Article 44
(1) Eligible voters exercise the right to local government through the representative body that they elect and by way
of local referendum.
(2) With the exception of mid-term elections, members of local representative bodies are elected for a term of four
years.
(3) The mandate of the representative body shall extend to the inaugural session of the newly elected representative
body; the mandate of the Mayor shall extend to the election of the new Mayor.
(3) A representative body may declare its dissolution prior to the expiration of its mandate and in accordance with
the conditions stipulated in the law on local governments. Upon dissolution of the body [Article 19, Paragraph
(3), Point l)] the mandate of the Mayor also ends.
Article 44A
(1) The local representative body - a) shall independently manage and administrate the affairs of local government
and its decisions may only be reviewed with respect to their legality;
b) shall exercise the rights of ownership in the assets of local government, independently manage local government
revenues, and may undertake business activities at its own liability;
c) shall be entitled to its own revenues for attending to the duties of local government as prescribed by law, and shall
furthermore be entitled to state support commensurate to the scope of such duties;
d) shall determine the types and rates of local taxes in accordance with the framework established by law;
e) shall independently establish its own organization and rules of procedure in accordance with the framework
established by law;
f) may develop symbols and emblems of government, and establish local honors and titles;
g) may present proposals to the authorities responsible for decisions that affect the local population;
h) may freely merge with other local representative bodies and create associations of local government for the
representation of their interests, may co-operate with the local governments of other countries and may be a member
of international associations of local government.
(2) Local representative bodies may issue decrees, which may not conflict with legal statutes of a superior order.
Article 44B
(1) The Mayor is the chairman of the local representative body. The representative body may elect committees and
create offices.
(2) In exceptional cases the Mayor may attend to state administrative duties and authorities in addition to his
responsibilities of local government, in accordance with the law or a government decree authorized by law.
(3) State administrative duties and authority may be assigned to the Clerk of local representative bodies and in
exceptional cases to the Director of the Office of Local Government.
Article 44C
A majority of two-thirds of the votes of the Members of Parliament present is required to pass the law on local
governments. The fundamental rights of local governments may be restricted by a law which also requires a two-
thirds majority.
